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Abstract. In Richard Bradley's book, Decision Theory with a Human Face (2017), we have 
selected two themes for discussion. The first is the Bolker-Jeffrey (BJ) theory of decision, 
which the book uses throughout as a tool to reorganize the whole field of decision theory, and 
in particular to evaluate the extent to which expected utility (EU) theories may be normatively 
too demanding. The second theme is the redefinition strategy that can be used to defend EU 
theories against the Allais and Ellsberg paradoxes, a strategy that the book by and large 
endorses, and even develops in an original way concerning the Ellsberg paradox. We argue 
that the BJ theory is too specific to fulfil Bradley’s foundational project and that the 
redefinition strategy fails in both the Allais and Ellsberg cases. Although we share Bradley’s 
conclusion that EU theories do not state universal rationality requirements, we reach it not by 
a comparison with BJ theory, but by a comparison with the non-EU theories that the 
paradoxes have heuristically suggested.  
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1. Introduction  
 
While the theory of decision under risk and uncertainty has long departed from the expected 
utility (EU) rule of decision in its empirical branch, this rule still looms large in the concerns 
of its normative branch. This is not to say that it goes unquestioned there; rather, it is 
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subjected to regular waves of reappraisal, with a fairly wide range of final conclusions, some 
of which clearly supportive of the claim that EU theory captures the essentials of a theory of 
rational agency, others clearly dismissive of this claim, whereas still others accept it under 
diverse qualifications. Generally, these assessments focus on the version of the theory that 
Savage’s canonical treatise, The Foundations of Statistics (1954-1972), developed for 
decision under uncertainty, i.e., the subjective expected utility (SEU) version. But they also 
often cover the version that von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944-1947) and their followers 
had developed for decision under risk, as well as alternatives that are less easy to classify. The 
common feature of most of these versions is to represent an individual’s choice as if it 
resulted from the maximization of the mathematical expectation, for some probability 
measure that may or may not be specific to that individual, of some quantitative notion of 
benefit that is specific to that individual. 
 
Richard Bradley's recent book, Decision Theory with a Human Face (2017), offers an original 
variation on this format of assessment. Despite its proclaimed objective of making decision 
theory psychologically more realistic, it does not call into question the standard division 
between the positive and the normative when it comes to expounding decision theory, and 
most of its material can be located on the latter side of this division. At the same time, while 
laying significant emphasis on the EU rule of decision, and especially its SEU form, it 
approaches this rule from the perspective of Jeffrey’s (1965-1983) theory of decision, which 
relates to it in a notoriously complex way. Neither does Jeffrey separate his concepts in the 
way EU theorists normally do, nor does his quantitative rule of decision mathematically 
belong to the expectational model that these theorists share. For Bradley, these departures 
mean a methodological advantage. As he writes, “the fact that Jeffrey’s theory imposes much 
weaker requirements on the framing of decision problems is [his] primary reason for 
preferring his framework to Savage’s for developing a theory of decision with a human face” 
(p. 20). Underlying the whole book is the view that Jeffrey’s theory outlines the definition of 
rational agency that decision theory needs in its normative guise. That the desiderata EU 
theorists put on individual choice may not be compelling will come out clearly if an 
encompassing perspective on rationality is adopted, and – here is the major claim, which our 
first aim will be to evaluate – Jeffrey’s theory can provide such a perspective. Bradley devotes 
a great deal of technical effort to flesh out Jeffrey’s theory and its axiomatic complement in 
Bolker (1966) so as to make this last claim plausible. For he also makes it clear that these 
pioneering contributions provide no more than an outline that needs to be filled out.  
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The second aim of the paper is to follow the book in another, quite different theoretical 
direction. Although Bradley makes generally critical judgments on EU theories when he 
approaches them from the viewpoint of his enriched Bolker-Jeffrey (BJ) theory, he seems to 
be unconvinced by the more familiar objections that have been raised against them on the 
basis of two famous paradoxes of decision theory, i.e., Allais’s (1953) and Ellsberg’s (1961). 
Unlike some decision theorists who view these paradoxes as merely empirical refutations, he 
recognizes that they may have a potential for normative refutation, but his considered view 
seems to be that they can be deflated by the technique of redefining the decision problems 
appropriately. Besides being a popular theme in the philosophy of decision theory, this 
redefinition technique is in and for itself of significant conceptual interest. Bradley’s book 
provides a natural opportunity for dealing with it because he discusses it at more than one 
place; see p. 55-56 and 172-174 concerning Allais’s paradox, and p. 175-177 and 287-288 
concerning Ellsberg’s. The way he sets up a redefinition strategy against the latter paradox is 
original, which is another reason for our second thematic choice. (We will also use Bradley’s 
2016 article, which provides more details on this strategy.) 
 
In a book in which there is so much to praise and approve of, we have selected the two 
aforementioned themes precisely because we found them to be loci of disagreement. We 
concur with Bradley on his claim that the normative conditions imposed by EU theories are 
not universal rationality requirements, but doubt that the Bolker-Jeffrey (BJ) theory, even 
when expanded as is done in the book, has the resources to reorganize decision theory as a 
whole, and in fact we also doubt that it can offer a truly enlightening perspective on EU 
theories. This critical argument is the object of section 2. In another departure, we will call 
into question the redefinition strategy used to defend these theories against the paradoxes. 
Section 3 carries the argument for Allais’s paradox, and section 4 for Ellsberg’s. By investing 
the paradoxes with normative force and observing how exactly the redescription strategy fails 
to dissolve them away, we are led to suggest an alternative to Bradley’s treatment of these 
theories: It is the corpus of non-EU theories developed from the paradoxes that offer the most 
illuminating viewpoint on the limitations of the EU rule of decision.  
 
2. The Bolker-Jeffrey theory and expected utility theory 
 
This section comments on the BJ theory, both in its original form and in Bradley’s expanded 
form, with a view of determining whether it really deserves its overarching role. Although a 
complete assessment would exceed the limits of this article, we mean to take a position on the 
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two main issues involved here, i.e., whether the original BJ theory is general enough for a 
reconstruction of decision theory, and whether, once expanded, it provides a benchmark to 
evaluate EU theories. We will tackle these two issues in succession. When dealing with the 
first, we will often use Savage as a point of comparison – a standard practice in discussions 
concerning Jeffrey.  
 
The formal construction in the original BJ theory is erected by using a single building block - 
the proposition, taken in the Boolean sense of propositional logic, hence subjected to the 
standard operations of negation, disjunction and conjunction.1  This unique primitive is meant 
to express three decision-theoretic concepts that, by contrast, Savage distinguishes formally, 
i.e., the state of nature, the consequence, and the act. By another contrast, Bradley’s formal 
reconstruction still uses propositions as building blocks, but differentiates them internally so 
as to express the differences between the preceding three concepts. In the original BJ theory, 
any proposition has the ability to express states, consequences or acts, depending on which 
interpretation pleases the decision theorist. Jeffrey’s followers have often argued for this 
semantic versatility on the ground that Savage’s alternative approach involves conceptual 
difficulties; these are reviewed in Joyce (1999, ch. 2) and Bradley (2017, ch. 1), who take 
roughly similar lines. There is no disputing the fact Savage’s definitions do not fully agree 
with the common sense understanding of decision-theoretic concepts. This may be clearest 
from the fact that Savage’s approach requires the state-independence of utility and the act-
independence of probability. But this does not say that the BJ theory is in a position to resolve 
the familiar difficulties which this raises. To the contrary, it seems that a solution would be 
forthcoming only if the concepts of states, consequences and acts were kept distinct. To blur 
their differences is not a way of overcoming the problem of how to formalize them.2    
 
In Bolker's (1966) mathematical treatment, which is the advanced part of BJ theory, the 
propositions receive a more precise algebraic form and the preference relation, as defined on 
these objects, satisfy axiomatic conditions in the style of those of decision theory. A 
representation theorem follows, i.e., from this material Bolker derives the existence of a 
utility function V, called desirability by Jeffrey, and of a probability measure P, both defined 
                                                 
1 The Boolean operations can of course be replaced by the standard set-theoretic operations on some 
set.  Jeffrey’s followers use this handier notation.      
2 As Bolker (1967, p. 335) himself writes, “we blur the often useful distinction among acts, 
consequences and events”. This critical point is a major reason why mathematical decision theorists 
are generally unattracted to the BJ theory (see, e.g., Fishburn, 1981, p. 194). Bradley (2017, p. 159) 
notes this disinclination, in contrast with the high consideration of the theory among philosophers.        
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on the Boolean algebra of propositions Ω. These items combine as follows: for all disjoint 
propositions α, β in Ω,  
(*) V(α ˅ β) = [P(α)V(α) + P(β)V(β)] / [P(α) + P(β)],  
where ˅ denotes the Boolean disjunction. For exactness, we reproduce a statement of Bolker's 
representation theorem in the appendix (see also Bradley, 2017, p. 83). We will now question 
the suggestion commonly made by Jeffrey’s followers that the conditions in this theorem are 
easily acceptable as rationality conditions, or at least are more so than those of Savage's 
representation theorem. Here is Bradley (2017, p. 20) again: "the foundational representation 
theorems for [Jeffrey's theory] require much weaker assumptions about rational preference 
[than Savage's]".3 
 
Some of Bolker's conditions bear on the objects of preference themselves, i.e., the 
propositions. He requires them to belong to a complete atomless Boolean algebra. This limits 
the range of applications of the theorem, as he implicitly recognizes (see Bolker, 1967, p. 
336-337). Heuristically, there is a tension between the two requisites on the algebra, since 
completeness would be most easily secured by taking it to be the power set of some set, but 
this choice would contradict the fact that it is atomless, since the singletons would then enter 
the algebra. As Bolker mentions, a complete atomless Boolean algebra is an essentially 
unique object.4 One should add in fairness that Savage also imposes strong structural 
restrictions on his basic sets. In particular, like Bolker’s non-atomicity condition, his 
divisibility postulate P6 entails that the state set has infinite cardinality. However, there are 
alternative settings and axiom systems that place structural restrictions differently from those 
of Savage, but deliver equally powerful derivations of the SEU rule, so that users of decision 
theory can avail themselves of whatever representation theorem best agrees with their 
intended application. Thus, Anscombe and Aumann’s (1963) representation theorem adapts 
Savage’s to a finite state space.5 By contrast, Bolker's representation theorem has remained a 
mostly isolated performance. Some writers have proved a version of it for finite Boolean 
algebras, but by offering only a partial replication, because they lack the uniqueness statement 
                                                 
3 Note that this claim literally concerns the preference axioms, not the domain assumptions, to be 
discussed in the next paragraph.      
4 Up to an isomorphism, it is identical to the set of measurable subsets of the unit interval, when two 
subsets that differ by a set of measure zero are identified with each other; see Halmos (1974, p. 173). 
Singletons, which are measurable subsets of the unit interval, disappear from consideration as they are 
identified with the empty set.      
5 There are other variants with the same purpose, each being based on a different set of assumptions; a 
recent example has appeared in Mongin and Pivato (2015).      
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that a satisfactory representation theorem needs to complement an existence statement – see 
the appendix for details. 
 
Bolker defines the preference relation on the complete atomless Boolean algebra of 
propositions less its minimal element, and submits it to two axioms. Impartiality does not 
appear to have a justification independently of the objective of deriving the existence of a 
probability measure in his representation theorem. Bolker (1967, p. 337) and Jeffrey (1965-
1983, p. 147) acknowledge this defect; they may have argued that Savage's corresponding 
postulate P4 is not in a better position. By contrast, they are willing to defend Averaging as a 
relatively modest rationality axiom, compared with Savage's demanding Sure-Thing Principle 
(STP), and all their followers – no doubt Bradley among them – endorse this favourable 
assessment. Indeed, granting the difference in preference objects, Averaging is a form of the 
dominance condition of decision theory, which is widely regarded as the least problematic 
part of the STP. But this praise must be qualified by the observation that Averaging forces the 
elements of the Boolean algebra to have non-zero probability values; so much becomes clear 
once the representation theorem is proved. For all its constraining postulates, Savage's system 
at least avoids this unpalatable implication. To allow for zero probability events matters a 
great deal not only when there are several interacting agents to consider, as in game theory, 
but also in decision theory, when one includes the single agent in a dynamic setting.   
 
We have just argued that if Jeffrey's definition of the objects of preference is non-committal, 
this is a mixed blessing, and that Bolker's conditions for their part are so specific as to be 
uneasy to apply. But Bradley’s book suggests an answer to each worry. For one thing, he 
undertakes to give Jeffrey's non-descript propositions some internal structure borrowed from 
the logical theory of conditionals; by this move, he intends to reproduce Savage's distinction 
between states, consequences and acts within Jeffrey's propositional framework.6  For another 
thing, using a desirability-probability pair (P,V) defined on these new preference objects, he 
states a number of theses, conditions and properties, thus illustrating the expressive power of 
the BJ theory in concreto. These items specialize the representation of preferences one way or 
another, and a connection with EU theories arises at this juncture. Precisely, two theorems 
(2017, p. 164 and 168) are said to recover EU formulas, in the spirit of von Neumann and 
                                                 
6 With relevant technical differences, this move is already performed in Bradley (2007). Joyce (1999) 
also considers the possibility of giving internal structure to Jeffrey’s propositions, but his final move 
consists in partitioning the algebra of these propositions in different ways, with each partition 
corresponding to a particular interpretation of a decision-theoretic concept (i.e., a state, a consequence 
or an act). Bradley also uses partitions of the set of propositions with this semantic purpose; see the 
example in the paragraph following the next.        
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Morgenstern and Savage respectively, from relevant lists of specializing conditions. As these 
conditions are “very demanding” (2017, p. 169), the theorems warrant the judgment that EU 
theories go beyond what may be expected from a rational agent.7 Let us now comment on the 
two moves just stated. 
 
Bradley’s derivation of EU formulas within his enriched BJ theory goes in terms of a (P,V) 
representation, not the primitive preference relation. It is obviously more convenient to work 
with the former than the latter. However, only a representation theorem can tell whether this 
shortcut is justified. One should first ensure that when putting more structure on the original 
BJ propositions, one has not lost the completeness and non-atomicity properties of the 
Boolean algebra that are needed to derive the version of Bolker's representation theorem that 
fits the new framework. Thus, Bradley’s (2017, p. 70) definition of a conditional algebra 
should pass this test.8 Second, granting that it does, one should check whether the direct use 
of a (P,V) representation to state EU-relevant conditions agrees with the uniqueness 
conclusion of the theorem. Unfortunately, a problem arises in this respect. We illustrate it by 
commenting on Bradley’s (2017, p. 168) rendering of the SEU value of an act.  
 
What formally represents an act is an element ˄i (S i ⱶ C i) of the conditional algebra, where ˄ 
is the Boolean conjunction, ⱶ an axiomatically defined indicative conditional operator, and for 
i = 1, ..., n, S i and C i are partitioning subsets of propositions (with the interpretations that S i 
represent states, and the C i represent consequences).9 For acts so defined, the following 
defines a SEU representation: 
(**) ∑i=1,..,n V(S i ˄ C i) P (S i), 
If one replaced (P,V) by (P',V'), this formula would be preserved only if P' and P were equal, 
and V'  were a positive affine transform of V. These are the familiar uniqueness conditions of 
a SEU representation. However, the uniqueness part of Bolker's representation theorem is not 
strong enough to support them (see the appendix). This lack of invariance of (**) would 
appear to block the ensuing analysis of SEU theory.10 The problem raised here may affect 
                                                 
7 There are more details on these theorems in Bradley and Stefansson’s (2017) article. This article 
takes an even stronger stand against the view that a rational agent should behave as EU theories 
prescribe.        
8  In particular, this definition should handle the role of singletons appropriately; see fn. 4.      
9 Notice incidentally that this propositional rendering of an act only holds for simple acts, i.e., those 
which have a finite number of distinct values. Savage’s formal concept of an act is not so restricted.       
10 This invariance problem has a clear conceptual underpinning. When the standard uniqueness 
property of SEU representations holds, the agent’s beliefs and desires are well identified and moreover 
separated from each other. But Bolker's uniqueness conditions are too weak to fulfil this purpose, as, 
e.g., Joyce (1999, p. 136) notes.    
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other statements of theses, conditions or properties, since all these statements are in terms of a 
(P,V) representation.   
 
There is a possible remedy to the looseness of the uniqueness conditions in Bolker's 
representation theorem. As he has shown, if the V function is unbounded above and below, 
these conditions become identical with those of standard SEU theory. However, this 
boundedness restriction appears artificial and furthermore it is stated in terms of the 
representation itself, not the preference relation as would be desirable. 11 An alternative move, 
initially contemplated by Jeffrey and later implemented by Joyce (1999, p.138-145), is to 
complement Bolker’s preference relation with a qualitative probability relation, and connect 
the two by a suitable coherence condition. When this is done, the uniqueness part of Bolker’s 
representation theorem involves the same uniqueness conditions as in standard SEU theories. 
However, this strengthening in the conclusion is the counterpart of a strengthening in the 
assumptions that may be resisted not simply on the grounds of mathematical elegance, but 
also for a theoretical reason. The established analysis of subjective probability in decision 
theory consists in deriving it from the preference relation alone, which thus serves as the 
common primitive of the representation of beliefs and desires. To depart from this scheme is 
tantamount to departing from the main tradition of decision theory. Joyce fully endorses this 
departure as a consequence of his “non-pragmatist” position in the philosophy of probability, 
a position he formulates as the rejection of the tenet that “the laws of rational belief are 
underwritten by the laws of rational desire” (1999, p. 90; see also Joyce, 1998). Bradley can 
evade the predicament of his non-invariant formulas by replacing Bolker’s original 
representation theorem by Joyce’s version, but it remains to be seen whether he would be 
willing to pay the philosophical price that this substitution involves.12  
 
To summarize this section, we have begun by arguing that the original BJ theory could not 
constitute an appropriate starting point for a reconstruction of decision theory. Bradley in 
effect grants this point since he proposes enriching the BJ theory, but in another step, we have 
questioned the possibility of recovering EU theories via this construction.          
                 
 
 
                                                 
11 Jeffrey’s (1965-1983, p. 142) suggestion to match the unboundedness of desirability with a 
preference condition is obscure and usually omitted from the ensuing literature.    
12 Bradley (2017, p. 84-85) states Joyce’s version of Bolker’s representation theorem and adds that he 
will draw on it. Whether he effectively does in the sequel would need to be clarified.        
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 3. The redefinition strategy in the Allais paradox 
 
Moving to the second theme of this paper, this section explores the redefinition strategy that 
has sometimes been proposed to deflate the Allais paradox, a strategy that is echoed, and as it 
seems, by and large approved, by Bradley (2017, p. 55-56 and 172-174). A brief reminder 
concerning the paradox is in order.13 It challenges EU theory in the form given to it by von 
Neumann and Morgenstern (1944-1947) and followers. Their setting drastically simplifies 
Savage’s arrangement of states, consequences and acts. There is a consequence set, no state 
set, and the objects of preference are lotteries, which are formalized as probability measures 
on the consequence set; these objects implicitly play the role of acts since an act of choice can 
be identified with what it chooses.14  
 
Allais (1953 and 1979) staged an ideal agent who is asked to make two choices in succession, 
first between lotteries p1 and q1, and then between lotteries p2 and q2 (the numbers are million 
French francs): 
 
 
p1 : 100 with prob 1 
 
p2 : 100 with prob 0.11;  
       0 with prob 0.89 
 
q1 : 500 with prob 0.10; 
      100 with prob 0.89;  
      0 with prob 0.01 
 
q2 : 500 with prob 0.10; 
       0 with prob 0.90 
                   Table 1 
 
Under the assumption that the agent’s choices comply with the von Neumann-Morgenstern 
(VNM) theory, the following equivalence holds: 
(***) The agent chooses p1 over q1 if and only if he chooses p2 over q2.  
This is readily checked by noting that the following two inequalities are equivalent: 
u(100) > 0.10 u(500) + 0.01 u(0) + 0.89 u(100)  
                                                 
13 The paradox has given rise to a large literature, which is covered in part by Mongin (2019). 
14 “Outcome” is a more common term than “consequence” in the VNM context, but we use the latter 
for uniformity. 
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and 
0.11 u(100) + 0.89 u(0) > 0.10 u(500) + 0.90 u(0).  
Allais's proposed resolution of the two choice problems is (p1, q2), which thus violates the 
VNM theory. The large experimental literature spawned by his paradox has led many, even 
among specialists, to overlook the fact that he intended it as a normative argument against this 
theory. Mongin (2019) has stressed this underestimated facet of the paradox, and 
distinguished between a weak normative reading, to the effect that the (p1, q2) pair of choices 
cannot be dismissed as being irrational, while the VNM-abiding pairs cannot be dismissed on 
this ground either, and a strong normative reading, to the effect that for at least some 
individuals, (p1, q2) is the unique rational pair. Allais sketches two reasons for his resolution. 
Even on the weaker reading of the paradox, they are an embarrassment for EU theorists.  
 
According to Allais's certainty argument, in the first choice problem, the absolute certainty of 
p1, given the relatively high gain it secures, is a reason for the agent to choose it over q1 
despite the fact that the chance of getting nothing in this lottery is very small.  In the other 
choice problem, the same agent could very well choose q2 over p2, i.e., the riskier of the two 
lotteries, because the chances of getting nothing are nearly equal whereas the possible gains 
are substantially different. According to the complementarity argument (well identified by 
Bradley, 2017, p. 172-173), the 1% chance of getting nothing in lottery q1 of the first choice 
problem reappears in the second one as a difference between the 90% chances of getting 
nothing in q2 and the 89% chances of getting nothing in p2. However, this 1% chance has a 
different psychological effect in the two situations: being isolated in the first, it has a weight it 
does not have in the second, where other chances of getting nothing occur in both lotteries.  
 
There is a possible move to salvage VNM theory from the paradox, and this move is not 
entirely unrelated to Allais’s statement of reasons for the paradoxical choices.15 Roughly 
speaking, it consists in saying that the agent’s choices are influenced by his anticipation of the 
negative feelings that these choices could bring about after the fact. This broad idea can be 
cashed in terms of regret or disappointment. The agent will fear to experience these feelings if 
the 0 consequence in q1 realizes, because there is a small unit chance of getting this 
consequence, but he will not associate the same fear with the realization of 0 in p2 or q2, 
                                                 
15 While the explanation suggested by Allais may thus be used as a motivation, Allais himself would 
not have condoned the move described next. He advocated instead the development of a proper 
alternative to VNM theory. That being clarified, the first elaborate occurrence of the move may be in 
Raiffa (1968, p. 85-86), who actually contemplates it without endorsing it. Like Savage (1954-1972, p. 
101-103), Raiffa interprets the paradoxical pair of choices as an irrationality that needs to be corrected.  
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because, this time, there are several chances of getting it and together they make it the likely 
consequence. This psychological reasoning suggests that the two choice problems may be 
rewritten in the following way:   
 
 
p1 : 100 with prob 1 
 
p2 : 100 with prob 0.11;  
       0 with prob 0.89 
 
 
q1* : 500 with prob 0.10; 
        100 with prob 0.89;  
        0 and regret or 
disappointment with prob 0.01 
 
q2 : 500 with prob 0.10; 
       0 with prob 0.90 
   Table 2 
 
Let us now return to (***). This equivalence is not falsified anymore if the second lottery in 
the first choice problem is q1* rather than q1. However, there is much to be said against such a 
resolution of the paradox. 
 
The first and quite obvious objection is that the theory has been salvaged only in a logically 
trivial sense. What is problematic in (***) is the implication that if the agent chooses p1 over 
q1, then he chooses p2 over q2. Now with Table 2, this implication holds, but only because its 
antecedent clause is not satisfied. One would have rather hoped a reformulation that would 
permit inferring - and thus tentatively explaining - the paradoxical choices. As these 
contradict the VNM theory, this more ambitious objective would have required that this 
theory be reformulated. Theories of regret or disappointment avoidance become relevant at 
this juncture.16 The laziness of the present revision, which by contrast merely consists in 
rewriting the choice problems, is obvious. Notice that the logical triviality which we highlight 
here is much more specific than the methodological triviality discussed elsewhere in the 
redescription literature, i.e., the concern that seemingly any consideration can be brought to 
bear on the redescription of an outcome. The propositions currently available for alleviating 
                                                 
16 See, among others, the theories developed for regret avoidance in Bell (1982) and Loomes and 
Sugden (1982), and for disappointment avoidance in Bell (1985) and Loomes and Sugden (1986).  All 
these theories significantly depart from the VNM one. On regret theory, see also the retrospective by 
Bleichrodt and Wakker (2015).      
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methodological triviality (see for instance the recent survey in Buchak, 2013, ch. 4) leave 
logical triviality entirely unaddressed.    
 
There is a second objection, which relates to the particular way choice problems are rewritten. 
If one is willing to include feelings in the definition of consequences, this should be done 
anywhere that is necessary, and not simply at one place. We illustrate this with 
disappointment. Unlike regret, which is prompted by comparing the chosen action with a non-
chosen one in terms of their respective consequences, disappointment follows from 
comparing the consequences of one and the same action. There cannot be any disappointment 
associated with p1, but q1 contains two occasions for disappointment, i.e., the realization of 0 
instead of 100 or 500, and that of 100 instead of 500. Each of p2 and q2 contains an occasion 
for disappointment, i.e., the realization of 0 instead of 100, and that of 0 instead of 500, 
respectively. It would be unnecessary to fill Table 2 with the missing disappointment data if 
the point were only to preserve VNM theory in a logically trivial sense; but we have just said 
that this was too mediocre an objective. These data become relevant precisely if one is after a 
genuine explanation of the Allais paradox in terms of disappointment, and the theories of 
disappointment avoidance developed in non-EU theory indeed require them to be stated 
exhaustively. 
 
Lastly and perhaps most importantly, one may question a step that the previous paragraph 
took for granted. It is questionable that when the choice of a lottery brings about negative 
feelings, they need to be captured by redefining the consequences. A more natural way of 
taking them into account is to include them in the evaluation of consequences, while leaving 
the definition of the latter unchanged, and this is indeed how the non-EU theories of regret or 
disappointment avoidance proceed. They capture the psychological element by properties of 
the utility function, the way it combines with the probabilities, or both aspects. Admittedly, 
the issue touched upon here is intricate, because it relates to the principle of consequentialism, 
which claims that as much content as possible should be packed in the description of 
consequences, and there are relevant arguments for supporting this principle in decision 
theory. To discuss consequentialism would require a separate paper, but we may briefly say 
that it is only a methodological principle, and that like any such principle, it should be judged 
by its fruitfulness.  It seems clear that it would be utterly unpractical to develop a theory of 
regret or disappointment avoidance in terms of a utility function defined on items such as (x 
with/without regret/disappointment), rather than on consequences as usually defined. Here 
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again, the testimony of the full-fledged theories of regret or disappointment avoidance 
available in non-EU theory is unequivocal. 
 
Actually, when the Allais paradox is subjected to the redefinition strategy, the typical 
objective is not to preserve VNM theory as was implied in our discussion. Instead, most users 
of this strategy – Bradley among them – apply it to Savage’s STP. They reformulate the 
paradox by introducing a framework of states of nature in which this principle makes sense. A 
typical example is as follows. Here lotteries are represented by assuming that the decision 
theorist makes a drawing from an urn with 100 equiprobable balls:17              
  
 Balls 1-10 Ball 11 Balls 12-100 
p1 100 100 100 
q*1 500  0 and regret or 
disappointment 
100 
p2 100 100 0 
q2 500      0 0 
  Table 3 
 
Given that the 100 ball urn defines a set of states of the world, the initial lotteries of the Allais 
paradox can be turned into acts in Savage's sense, i.e., mappings from states to consequences. 
The resulting framework really is intermediate between the VNM one, in which probabilities 
are attributed to consequences without states being defined, and the Savage one, in which 
states are explicit and probabilities appear only in the representation theorem.   
 
At any rate, within this framework, the STP can become the focus of attention. As a brief 
reminder, this principle says that if a preference comparison holds between two acts f and g 
that share the same consequences over some subset P of the state space, the same preference 
comparison holds when f and g coincide again on P with different shared consequences and 
remain otherwise unchanged. In Table 3, f and g are p1 and q*1 and they share a common 
consequence of 100 million on a set P, which is “Balls 12-100”. Then, f and g become p2 and 
q2, which have a new common consequence of 0 on P. By the STP, p1 is preferred to q*1 if 
                                                 
17 This representation is popular among philosophers of decision theory when they discuss the Allais 
paradox; see Buchak (2013, ch. 4) for an example and a list of previous references. It is actually 
inherited from Savage (1954-1972, p. 101-103), who used it in his rebuttal of the Allais paradox. 
However, Savage’s rebuttal did not amount to using the redefinition strategy, which is these writers’ 
focus of attention.    
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and only if p2 is preferred to q2, an equivalence that the pair (p1, q2) contradicts. The received 
argument is that Table 3 salvages the STP. For this principle to apply, it must be the case that 
p1 is equal to p2, and q*1 equal to q2, outside the subset P of common values, but this is not 
the case on the state “Ball 11”.  
 
The three objections previously raised against the redefinition strategy can be repeated here 
with equal force. But there is still another way of disposing of the present use of the strategy, 
which is simply to point out that a discussion of the Allais paradox should deal with the VNM 
theory, not with the Savage one. The difference in the objects of the two theories, which we 
have emphasized, precludes any straightforward identification of their respective axioms. In 
the standard use of the redefinition strategy, there is a faulty amalgamation of the VNM 
independence condition, which is the prominent axiom of von Neumann and Morgenstern, 
with the STP, which is the prominent postulate of Savage.18 
 
We now complete our rebuttal with an argument that is relative to another part of VNM 
theory, namely the principle of compound lotteries. In essence, the principle says that agent 
makes no difference between a compound lottery – i.e., a lottery having some lotteries among 
its consequences – and its reduction to an ordinary lottery, as obtained by applying the 
multiplication rule of probabilities.19 To see how this works on the Allais paradox, one needs 
to introduce the following auxiliary lottery:  
l : 500 with prob 10/11, 
    0 with prob 1/11. 
Then, Allais's two choice problems are restated as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
18 Heuristically, there is more to VNM independence than to the STP, and this is confirmed by a step 
in Savage’s proof of his representation theorem, in which he derives the VNM lottery framework and 
axiom system with a view of using the VNM representation theorem as a lemma (see Savage, 1954-
1972, p. 73-76, and Fishburn, 1970, p. 203-206). This derivation requires Savage’s full set of 
postulates P1-P6.  
19 The principle is more commonly said of “reduction of compound lotteries”, a slightly misleading 
phrase because it operates in both directions, from the compound form to the reduced one, and vice-
versa. It is actually contained in the mathematical representation of a lottery as a probability measure 
on the set of consequences X, because this representation automatically identifies a convex 
combination of probability measures on X (hence a compound lottery) with a probability measure on X 
(hence a reduced form lottery).       
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p'1 : 100 with prob 0.11; 
       100 with prob 0.89 
p2 : 100 with prob 0.11; 
       0 with prob 0.89 
q'1 :  l  with prob 0.11; 
       100 with prob 0.89 
q'2 : l with prob 0.11; 
       0 with prob 0.89 
    Table 4 
With this restatement, Allais's pair of choices become (p'1, q'2). Let us now return to Table 2 
and see how the principle of compound lotteries would operate on it. Given the redefinition of 
consequences in the first choice problem, we need to introduce a new auxiliary lottery: 
l+ : 500 with prob 10/11, 
      0 and regret or disappointment with prob 1/11; 
Now from the principle of compound lotteries, Table 2 is equivalent to:  
 
p'1 : 100 with prob 0.11; 
       100 with prob 0.89 
p2 : 100 with prob 0.11; 
       0 with prob 0.89 
q'1 : l+ with prob 0.11;      
       100 with prob 0.89 
q'2 : l with prob 0.11;      
        0 with prob 0.89 
      Table 5 
 
We claim that this restatement is psychologically dubious. Suppose that a drawing of q'1 
results in the lottery l+ and the drawing made in this lottery results in the bad final 
consequence, i.e., 0 and regret or disappointment. Now let us similarly suppose that a 
drawing of q'2 results in l, and the subsequent drawing in the bad final consequence, i.e., 0. 
Why should the agent have a negative feeling in one sequence of drawings and not in the 
other? If 0 is disappointing, this is by comparison with 500, and this comparison is the same 
in both cases. The crucial point is that bygones are bygones. When reaching the stage of a 
second drawing, the agent does not have to consider the unrealized consequences 100 or 0. A 
more roundabout argument would take care of the regret interpretation of the negative feeling. 
From this psychological discussion, it follows that there is no reason to distinguish between l 
and l+ as is done in Table 5. Nevertheless, it appears that, if the principle of compound 
lotteries holds, this table is equivalent to Table 2. Thus, one of two things has to give, either 
the principle, or the redefinition strategy that led to Table 2. It would be incoherent to deny 
the principle in order to salvage the strategy, since the strategy itself is intended to salvage 
VNM theory, which includes the principle as a component part. Accordingly, it is the strategy 
that should go. Accordingly, one way or another, one cannot avoid venturing into non-EU 
territory. 
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4. The redefinition strategy in the Ellsberg paradox 
  
Ellsberg’s (1961) paradox challenges SEU theory and more generally the principle of 
probabilistic sophistication, to the effect that the agent’s decision rule is based on a subjective 
probability measure.20 In a conveniently simplified variant, the paradox goes as follows. A 
three-ball urn is known to contain one red ball and two other balls that are either black or 
yellow in unknown proportions. One ball is to be drawn from the urn and the agent is faced 
with two successive choice problems, each of which involves two bets on the colour of the 
ball. The first choice is between the bet that the colour is red (f1) and the bet that it is black 
(g1); the second choice is between the bet that the colour is red or yellow (f2) and the bet that 
it is black or yellow (g2). Ellsberg's own solution is (f1, g2). To see that this pair of choices 
contradicts probabilistic sophistication, assume in standard fashion that, when faced with two 
bets, which put the same stake on two different events, the agent prefers to bet on the event he 
regards as being the more likely. Then, the agent takes “red” to be more likely than “black” 
(first choice), but also takes “black or yellow” to be more likely than “red or yellow” (second 
choice), which contradicts the additivity of probability. That Ellsberg's pair of choices (f1, g2) 
also contradicts Savage’s core postulate for SEU theory, i.e., the STP, can be seen from the 
next table, in which bets are listed as rows and states of the world as columns. A $100 stake 
has been fixed for concreteness. 
 
              R                B Y 
f1 100 0 0 
g1 0 100 0 
f2 100 0 100 
g2 0 100 100 
        Table 6 
Since f2 and g2 can be obtained from f1 and g1 simply by changing their common consequence 
on the state Yellow from 0 to 100, preferring f1 to g1 and g2 to f2 violates the STP.  
 
Ellsberg gave a psychological explanation for these choices, which – like Allais for his 
recommended choices – he also meant to be an argument for their reasonableness, and as an 
                                                 
20 The difference between a SEU formula and the more recent formulas of probabilistic sophistication 
hinges on the fact that the latter may be non-linear in the probabilities; e.g., they may involve 
distorting the latter. For a review of the Ellsberg paradox and the surrounding literature, see Machina 
and Siniscalchi (2014).  
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invitation to explore non-EU theories. As this goes, the agent prefers betting on events that 
can be given precise probability values, such as Red in the first choice and Black or Yellow in 
the second, to betting on events that have imprecise probability values, such as Black in the 
first choice and Red or Yellow in the second.  Exactly 1/3 of the balls are red, 2/3 of the balls 
are black or yellow, but the proportion of black balls is 0, 1/3 or 2/3, and that of red or yellow 
balls is 1/3, 2/3 or 1. This account in terms of ambiguity aversion has been explored 
thoroughly in the literature; but we will follow a different line here.   
 
As some mathematical decision theorists have observed, the agent's uncertainty in the 
Ellsberg paradox can be redescribed in a way that casts a different light on the conflict 
between this paradox and the SEU conditions.21 Specifically, the states of the world can be 
redefined by specifying not only the colour of the ball drawn, as in the previous table, but also 
which set of coloured balls it is drawn from. In the next table, both pieces of information 
appear; e.g., R(RBB) means that Red is the colour of the ball drawn and that the urn has one 
red and two black balls. The latter information only concerns the number of coloured balls, 
irrespective of the order in which colours may be listed; i.e., instead of RBY, one could have 
written RYB, YRB, and so on. 
 
 R(RBB) R(RYY) R(RBY) B(RBB) B(RBY) Y(RYY) Y(RBY) 
f1 100 100 100 0 0 0 0 
g1 0 0 0 100 100 0 0 
f2 100 100 100 0 0 100 100 
g2 0 0 0 100 100 100 100 
          Table 7 
 
This move cannot yet dissolve the conflict with the STP and probabilistic sophistication since 
it has simply consisted in refining the initial states. However, now comes another move, 
which is to redefine the consequences. This can be done in several ways, and we first follow 
Bradley's (2017, p. 175-177) before defending an alternative way. Like other writers on 
Ellsberg’s paradox, Bradley relies on the natural symmetry assumption that for any 
composition of the urn, each ball has an equal chance of being drawn. Then, if the agent bets 
on B, his chances of winning $100 are not the same whether B(RBB) or B(RBY) realizes – 
they are 2/3 in the former and 1/3 in the latter. Bradley argues that consequences should be 
                                                 
21 This redescription is due to Ergin and Gul (2009) and further elaborated by Machina (2011).   
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redefined specifically so as to capture this difference in the chances of winning the bet, and 
thus replaces them with vectors (x; α), where x is the amount of money that results from the 
bet and the (redefined) state, and α is the chance of winning the bet that is associated with that 
state. The next table implements this suggestion.22  
 
 R(RBB) R(RYY) R(RBY) B(RBB) B(RBY) Y(RYY) Y(RBY) 
f1 (100; 1/3) (100; 1/3) (100; 1/3) (0; 1/3) (0; 1/3) (0; 1/3) (0; 1/3) 
g1 (0; 2/3) (0; 0) (0; 1/3) (100; 2/3) (100; 1/3) (0; 0) (0; 1/3) 
f2 (100; 1/3) (100; 1) (100; 2/3) (0; 1/3) (0; 2/3) (100; 1) (100; 2/3) 
g2 (0; 2/3) (0; 2/3) (0; 2/3) (100; 2/3) (100; 2/3) (100; 2/3) (100; 2/3) 
         Table 8 
 
After this joint operation on states and consequences, the Ellsberg pair of choices does not 
contradict the STP anymore. While f1 and g1, as well as f2 and g2, retain common consequence 
values on Y(RBY), they do not on Y(RYY), and moreover, the discrepancies between f1 and 
f2, and between g1 and g2, are such that the antecedent condition of the STP is not satisfied; 
hence this principle holds vacuously. Similarly, the argument used to show that the Ellsberg 
paradox contradicts probabilistic sophistication vanishes. For instance, it is not anymore  
possible to conclude from the choice of f1 over g1 that the agent regards the event R as being 
more probable than the event B; this is simply because the stakes are not anymore the same 
across the two bets. Of course, the point made against logically trivial resolutions applies here 
no less strongly than it did in our discussion of the Allais paradox. This is however not all 
there is to say on Bradley's proposal.  
 
On reflection, this proposal seems less natural and principled than the following alternative. 
Instead of associating with each monetary consequence the chance of winning the bet, given 
the state, let us associate with it the chance of drawing a ball of a given colour, from an urn of 
a given composition. Comparing with Table 8, this is, first, a more natural progression starting 
from the refinement of Table 6 into Table 7. Second, this tracks more rigorously the cause of 
all complications in the Ellsberg scenario, namely that two forms of uncertainty interact, the 
“subjective” uncertainty pertaining to the composition of the urn, and the “objective” 
                                                 
22 This corresponds to Table 5 in Bradley's (2016) article, which gives more details on his restatement 
of the Ellsberg paradox. The analysis reported next would also follow, had Bradley replaced each 
monetary consequence x by (x; ), with  the chance, given the redefined state, of receiving x ( 
generally differing from α, the associated chance of winning the bet). 
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uncertainty pertaining to the draw of a ball of a given colour from an urn of a given 
composition. Finally, generally speaking, it is more satisfactory to redefine a consequence (a 
cell of the initial table) by adding information that is specific to that consequence (like the 
chance of drawing a given ball from a given urn, which refers only to the column of the cell), 
than by adding information that pertains to the bet taken as a whole (such as the chance of 
winning the bet associated to that cell, that generically refers to another cell on the same row). 
However the strategies of redefining consequences should be finally evaluated, this appears to 
be more in line with what they intend to achieve.23 The next table implements this alternative 
redefinition of consequences. 
 
 R(RBB) R(RYY) R(RBY) B(RBB) B(RBY) Y(RYY) Y(RBY) 
f1 (100; 1/3) (100; 1/3) (100; 1/3) (0; 2/3) (0; 1/3) (0; 2/3) (0; 1/3) 
g1 (0; 1/3) (0; 1/3) (0; 1/3) (100; 2/3) (100; 1/3) (0; 2/3) (0; 1/3) 
f2 (100; 1/3) (100; 1/3) (100; 1/3) (0; 2/3) (0; 1/3) (100; 2/3) (100; 1/3) 
g2 (0; 1/3) (0; 1/3) (0; 1/3) (100; 2/3) (100; 1/3) (100; 2/3) (100; 1/3) 
         Table 9 
 
With this table, the argument about probabilistic sophistication is still blocked (the stakes 
differing too much across the bets), but the conflict with the STP reappears. Indeed, f1 and g1, 
and f2 and g2, have common parts on the Y event, exactly as in the initial setting; so Ellsberg’s 
pair of choices (f1, g2) violates the STP. The analysis of the paradox could be pursued to 
further clarify the distinction between the two forms of uncertainty that have been showed to 
underlie the paradox. The conclusion would be that the EU rule can be maintained on each 
component of uncertainty when it is taken separately, but still fail when they are considered 
jointly. The recently developed second-order EU theories exploit a similar contrast by 
introducing EU representations for both first- and second-order uncertainty, while 
maintaining a divide between these two forms; there is no way of reducing the second-order 
uncertainty to the first. These theories were in part heuristically motivated by the Ellsberg 
paradox and arguably provide an explanation for it.24 However, we may stop before this 
                                                 
23 Buchak (2013, p. 121-122) distinguishes between “local” and “global” redefinitions of 
consequences. Bradley’s suggestion is of the latter type, while ours is of the former.  Buchak is 
generally critical of the redescription literature, but perhaps more so when it takes the "global" form.     
24 See Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji (2005), Nau (2006) and Ergin and Gul (2009). The general 
principle is to have first-order uncertainty represented by a EU functional whose values serve as 
arguments for a non-linear transformation of the EU functional that represents second-order 
uncertainty. There are of course many alternative explanations for the Ellsberg paradox in the 
ambiguity literature, and we do not touch on them here.  
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advanced stage, as the last table already shows that the redefinition process fails to salvage 
SEU theory. A major lesson from this detailed examination is that – be it through second-
order EU theory or some other non-SEU model – it is unavoidable to venture into non-EU 
territory. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
We have seen that the paradoxes revisited here pose normative challenges to the EU rule, and 
that redefinition strategies have been devised to meet these challenges. The strategies are 
notably more complex in the Ellsberg case than in the Allais case, which may explain why the 
philosophy of decision theory is less profuse on the former than the latter, Bradley being an 
exception. The major observation in the Ellsberg case is that there are two different kinds 
uncertainty at work. A redefinition of the consequences also occurs, but as a by-product of 
that of the states of nature. With our proposed redefinition, unlike Bradley’s, SEU theory is 
still violated, so the strategy fails here for a logical reason. By contrast, in the Allais case, it 
fails for a compound of methodological and semantic reasons.  
 
Regardless of these differences, both paradoxes share the important feature that they 
irresistibly point towards explanations in terms of non-EU theories. By connecting the Allais 
choices with the feelings of regret or disappointment, the redefinition school opens the way to 
theories that have been developed to capture the avoidance of these feelings, and these 
theories depart from the EU rule of decision and its underlying axioms in various ways. By 
undertaking an explanation of the Ellsberg paradox in terms of a distinction between two 
forms of uncertainty, the redefinition school opens another Pandora box of non-EU theories. 
A general feature of either sets of theories is that they contradict the EU rule of decision for 
given values of their parameters, but also entail it for other values of these parameters, so that 
they should be more accurately described as generalizations of EU theories. As such, they 
offer a perspective from which it is possible to appreciate what makes EU theories special, 
and indeed more restrictive than rationality alone would require. Connecting here the analysis 
of paradoxes with the objections initially raised against the BJ theory, we submit that this 
non-EU perspective may be more enlightening than the alleged generalization provided by the 
latter.    
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APPENDIX 
 
The set of objects in Bolker's (1966) representation theorem as well as in the BJ theory 
generally speaking (see Jeffrey, 1965-1983) is a Boolean algebra Ω, whose elements will be 
termed propositions, using the analogy with propositional logic that is central to Jeffrey's 
interpretation. (Bradley says "prospects".) The usual ingredients of a Boolean algebra will be 
designated here in standard logical notation: ˅ and ˄ for the sup and inf operations, ⊨ for the 
induced relation, ١ and ٣ for the maximum and minimum elements. By a preference relation, 
we mean a weak ordering ≿ on Ω, with ≻ and ∼ denoting its asymmetric (or strict preference) 
and symmetric (or indifference) parts respectively.  
 
Bolker's representation theorem. Let Ω be a complete atomless Boolean algebra, less the 
proposition ٣, and let ≿ be a preference relation on Ω that is continuous and satisfies the 
following two conditions: 
(i) Averaging condition. If α and β are disjoint propositions of Ω, then 
α ≻ β ⟹ α ≻ α  ˅  β ≻ β, and 
α ∼ β ⟹ α ∼ α  ˅  β ∼ β; 
(ii) Impartiality. If α, β, γ are pairwise disjoint propositions of Ω, α ∼ β, not α ∼ γ, and α ˅ γ 
∼ β ˅ γ, then for all γ' in Ω that is disjoint from α and β, α ˅ γ' ∼ β ˅ γ'. 
Then, there exists a probability measure P and function V (a "desirability function") such that 
for all propositions α, β of Ω, 
α ≿ β ⇔ V(α) ≥ V(β),  
and if α and β are disjoint, 
V(α ˅ β) = [P(α)V(α) + P(β)V(β)] / [P(α) + P(β)]. 
Moreover, given the normalization V(١) = 0, the probability measure P' and the function V' 
can replace P and V in the above equations if and only if there exist a > 0 and c such that for 
all propositions α' of Ω, c V(α') + 1 > 0, with the following properties: for all propositions α of 
Ω,  
P' (α) = P (α) [cV(α) + 1] and V'(α) = aV(α) / [cV(α) + 1]. 
 
For finite Boolean algebras, Domotor (1978), and recently, Gravel, Marchant and Sen (2018) 
derive the existence part of the theorem from rather similar axioms, plus richness or 
continuity conditions put on the preference relation. These variants have no uniqueness result, 
which is unsurprising given the techniques of proof  appropriate for finite sets. Ahn’s (2008) 
version departs from Bolker’s and the above writers’ reliance on Boolean algebras, as he 
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defines his preference objects as sets of lotteries and, crucially, he exploits the topological 
structure of these sets. The axiom set includes a form of Averaging (there called Disjoint Set 
Betweenness) and a form of Impartiality (called Balancedness). The representation theorem 
has existence and uniqueness conclusions that are closely related to those of Bolker, whose 
mathematical contribution is put to work in the proof, but the utility representation is more 
precise as it takes the form of a conditional SEU formula.  
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